Cover page . Please refer to the cover page format of the academic citation style that you will use. If your professor does not have a cover page requirement, you can simply align your name, professor’s name, course, and deadline with the text.
Abstract . The abstract is the description of your paper. It provides the reader the aim of the paper, the significance of the issue, and the reason that drove you to write essays for me about it.
Introduction . The term paper’s introduction must begin with a statement about the topic. Mention current relevant events that contributed to the essence of the issue at hand. Clearly state how you aim to remedy the issue (thesis statement).
Body . The term paper’s body must contain the analysis. Relevant information about the issue to give the reader further understanding. Remember to include positions surrounding the issue and the analysis that you conducted that made you arrive at your thesis statement.
Results . Provide a clear, coherent, and logical explanation why your research has convinced you to believe certain things. What was your initial impression when you started the project? Do you still have it? Has it changed, and why? Connect your writing to your thesis statement that you made known in the introduction.
Discussion/Conclusion . Summarize all that you have written and convey your ultimate take on the topic. You are required to restate your thesis statement, only this time, it must have more significance in relation to the topic. Apart from this, you may also prompt the reader to conduct their own discussion on the topic by means of new research.
Which Academic Citation Style Should I Use For My Term Paper?
Readiness – this involves your mastery of the differences between academic papers (i.e. book review vs book report, university application essay vs research paper ) and the corresponding citation styles and the subjects they cover. Adequate familiarity with the unique qualities of all academic papers is a must to not be misled by a vague set of instructions. What is also very important is formatting your paper correctly.
Knowledge – Really needing no elaboration, you will not be able to write a term paper without knowledge, no matter how ready you are with respect to types of term papers and citation style use. Prerequisite to writing a term paper is the complete and holistic acquisition of knowledge and that can only be attained by attentiveness to your professor, writing essay down notes, seeking clarifications, and advanced research about the subject.
Time – Given a few weeks’ time, writing a term paper can be accomplished. Unlike a conventional easy essay writer or a regular research paper that can be written overnight with just a few days’ notice, writing a term paper demands extra breathing room. After all, you are to squeeze all that you have learned in a whole term or semester in one make-or-break paper. Hence, the collection and chronological organization of information must be carried out with utmost care – you cannot afford to leave out any significant bits. These factors, combined with the length and complexity of a term paper, behoove any professor to grant students with more than enough time to write their term papers.
The Reality of Writing a Term Paper
From the very outset of the philosophical study of the diversities of the universe, it has been noticed, that in many cases, where common sense is content to enumerate two, or three, or some other limited number of aspects or constituents of a supposed object, closer analysis shows that the variety contained in this object, if really existent at all, must be boundless, so that the dilemma: «Either no true variety of the supposed type is real, or else this variety involves an infinity of aspects,» has often been used as a critical test, to discredit some commonly received view as to the unity and variety of the universe or of some supposed portion thereof. Mr. Bradley has not been wanting in his appeal to this type of critical argument. But to give this argument its due weight, when it comes as a device for discrediting all efforts to define the nature of Individuals, requires one to attack the whole question of the actual Infinite, a question that recent discussions of the Philosophy of Mathematics have set in a decidedly new light, but that these discussions have also made more technical than ever. If I am to be just to this matter, I must therefore needs wander far afield. Nobody, I fear, except a decidedly technical reader, will care to follow. I have, therefore, hesitated long before venturing seriously to entertain the plan of saying, either here or elsewhere, anything about what seems to me the true, and, as I believe, the highly positive implication, of Mr. Bradley’s apparently most destructive arguments concerning Individual Being and concerning the meaning of the world of Appearance.
But if it is impossible to conceive qualities without relations, it is equally unintelligible to take qualities together with relations. For the qualities cannot be resolved into the relations. And, if taken with the relations, they «must be, and must also be related» (p. 31). But now afresh arises the problem as to how, in this instance, the variety involved in the also is reducible to the unity which each quality must by itself possess. For a quality, A, is made what it is both by its relations (since, as we have seen, these are essential to its being as a quality), and by something else, namely, by its own inner character. A has thus two aspects, both of which can be predicated of it. Yet «without the use of a relation it is impossible to predicate this variety of A,» just as it was impossible, except by the use of a relation, to predicate the various qualities of one thing. We have therefore to say that, within A, both its own inner character, as a quality, and its relatedness to other facts, are themselves, as varieties, facts; but such facts as constitute the being of A, so that they are united by a new relation, namely, by the very relation which makes them constitutive of A. Thus, however, «we are led by a principle of fission which conducts us to no end.» «The quality must exchange its unity for an internal relation.» This diversity «demands a new relation, and so on without limit.»
Meanwhile, the «mere conjunction,» if taken as such, is «for thought contradictory» (p. 565). For as soon as thought makes the conjunction its object, thought must «hold in unity» the elements of the conjunction. But finding these elements diverse, thought «can of itself supply no internal bond by which to hold them together, nor has it any internal diversity by which to maintain them apart.» If one replies that the elements are offered to thought «together and in conjunction,» Mr. Bradley retorts that the question is «how thought can think what is offered.» If thought were itself possessed of conjoining principles, of «a ‘together,’ a ‘between,’ and an ‘all at once,’» as its own internal principle, it could use them to explain the conjunction offered. But, as a fact (p. 566), «Thought cannot accept tautology, and yet demands unity in diversity. But your offered conjunctions, on the other side, are for it no connections or ways of union. They are themselves merely other external things to be connected.» It is, then, «idle from the outside to say to thought, ’Well, unite, but do not identify.’ How can thought unite except so far as in itself it has a mode of union? To unite without an internal ground of connection and distinction, is to strive to bring together barely in the same point, and that is self-contradiction.» Things, then, «are not contradictory because they are diverse,» but «just in so far as they appear as bare conjunctions.» Therefore it is that a mere together, «in space or time, is for thought unsatisfactory and, in the end, impossible.» But, on the other hand, every such untrue view must be transcended, and the Real is not self-contradictory, despite its diversities, since their real unity is, in the Absolute, present.
All this being understood, let us undertake to define a map that shall be in this sense perfect, but that shall be drawn subject to one special condition. It would seem as if, in case our map-drawing powers were perfect, we could draw our map wherever we chose to draw it. Let us, then, choose, for once, to draw it within and upon a part of the surface of the very region that is to be mapped. What would be the result of trying to carry out this one purpose? To fix our ideas, let us suppose, if you please, that a portion of the surface of England is very perfectly levelled and smoothed, and is then devoted to the production of our precise map of England. That in general, then, should be found upon the surface of England, map constructions which more or less roughly represent the whole of England, – all this has nothing puzzling about it. Any ordinary map of England spread out upon English ground would illustrate, in a way, such possession, by a part of the surface of England, of a resemblance to the whole. But now suppose that this our resemblance is to be made absolutely exact, in the sense previously defined. A map of England, contained within England, is to represent, down to the minutest detail, every contour and marking, natural or artificial, that occurs upon the surface of England. At once our imaginary case involves a new problem. This is now no longer the general problem of map making, but the nature of the internal meaning of our new purpose.
While, however, self-representative systems of ideal or of physical objects belonging to the later types play a great part in exact physical and in mathematical science, their study does not throw light upon the primal way in which the One and the Many, in the processes directly open to thought’s own internal observation, are genetically combined. For physical systems which permit these transformations of a whole into an exact image of itself are given as external «conjunctions,» such as crystal forms. We do not see them made. We find them. The ideal cases of the same type in pure mathematics have also a similar defect from the point of view of Bradley’s criticism. A system that is to be made self-representative through a «group of substitutions,» shows, therefore, the same diversities after we have operated upon it as before; and, furthermore, that congruence with itself which the system shows at the end of a self-representative operation of any type wherein all elements take the place of all, is not similar to what happens where, in our dealings with the universe, Thought and Reality, the Idea and its Other, Self and Not-Self, are brought into self-evident relations, and are at once contrasted with one another and unified in a single whole. Hence, we shall indeed continue to insist, in what follows, upon those self-representations wherein proper part and whole meet, and become in some wise precisely congruent, element for element.[16] We mention the other types of self-representation only to eliminate them from the present discourse.
